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Although we have become accustomed (and somewhat inured) 
to audacious judicial interventions into public affairs, the Supreme 
Court only occasionally decides a case that has truly fundamental 
implications for our political life. Dred Scott v. Sandford, Brown v. 
Board of Education, and Baker v. Carr are familiar examples. Such 
cases not only help to shape the nation's agenda for decades but also 
change common perceptions and expectations regarding our institu-
tional structures. The changes may have been underway for years, 
but the landmark case brings them to general attention and gives a 
name and a form to their existence. 
Just over two years ago the Court invalidated the legislative 
veto. This decision, entitled Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice v. Chadha, I may be a landmark case. As Justice White noted in 
dissent, Chadha struck down "in one fell swoop provisions in more 
laws enacted by Congress than the Court has cumulatively invali-
dated in its history."2 However, because the case was complicated 
and involved a relatively sophisticated legislative device likely to be 
understood, if at all, only among certain elites, its meaning and im-
portance are still obscure. It is as if the country had heard a loud 
thump in the dark: we know something has happened and we sus-
pect it may be important, even dangerous, but we are awaiting the 
thing's emergence into the light. Only time, of course, will reveal 
the historical importance of the case, but it clearly has the potential 
for significantly affecting governance in the United States for years 
to come. Moreover, it is possible to see in this remarkable decision 
the outlines of fundamental changes that have long been in the 
making. 
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. 
I. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
2. It is remotely possible that Justice White was too pessimistic and that the Court will 
find some way to distinguish the use of the legislative veto in a few of its other statutory 
settings. However, at the time of this writing the Supreme Court has shown no sign of this 
inclination; it has routinely approved lower courts' invalidation of at least two other legisla-
tive veto provisions. Dozens of similar challenges are now working their way through the 
judicial system. 
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I 
It is hard to imagine facts less likely to elicit a fundamental 
constitutional decision. Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian stu-
dent holding a British passport, overstayed the time limit in his 
nonimmigrant visa. In a routine action, the local official of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service began deportation proceed-
ings. Undoubtedly, Chadha was legally deportable under the 
relevant statute. Nor was there any doubt that Congress had ple-
nary authority under the Constitution to establish statutory stan-
dards for deporting nonresident aliens. 
The significance of the case was due to the procedures provided 
in the statute for the period following the initial deportation deci-
sion. Under the Immigration and Naturalization Act the Attorney 
General was authorized "in his discretion" to suspend a deportation 
and to report the suspension to Congress. The Act further provided 
that if "either the Senate or House of Representatives passes a reso-
lution stating . . . that it does not favor the suspension . . . , the 
Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien . . . ." 
Chadha's deportation was suspended by the Attorney General and 
the House then disapproved the suspension-in effect "vetoing" the 
administrative act of grace that the Act had authorized the Attor-
ney General to make in the first instance. The mundane facts of 
Chadha's deportation thus raised this constitutional issue: May a 
statute authorize Congress (or one House of Congress) to overturn 
specific acts of the executive branch by some means other than pass-
ing another statute? 
As everyone knows, the rise of the modern regulatory state has 
been accompanied by vast delegations of authority from the legisla-
tive branch to the executive. Constrained only by vague entreaties 
to be "just and reasonable" or to act "in the public interest," admin-
istrative agencies have been authorized to set shipping rates, to de-
fine and proscribe methods of unfair competition, to set safety 
standards, and so forth. The legislative veto is a device by which 
Congress has attempted to reconcile its obligation to limit the law-
making authority delegated to agencies with its inability to establish 
in advance specific standards to control the agencies. In one form 
or another, the legislative veto appears in some 200 federal statutory 
provisions, affecting decisions about governmental organization and 
budgeting, war making, environmental protection, energy policy, 
and many other matters. 
The most obvious importance of the Court's invalidation of the 
legislative veto in Chadha, then, is its potential for altering power 
relationships associated with the regulatory state. Chadha may in-
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duce Congress to regulate more clumsily (if Congress substitutes 
impracticably narrow and rigid delegations for the legislative veto). 
Or it may deter Congress from authorizing regulation in some fields 
(if effective regulation is thought to require an unacceptable delega-
tion of legislative authority). A third possibility-more probable 
and ominous-is that Chadha, having deprived Congress of its pre-
ferred method of control, may exacerbate the tendency to solve 
problems by a wholesale passing of the buck to the executive 
branch. 
The more sanguine view is that Chadha will encourage more 
responsible lawmaking in Congress. Without the crutch of the leg-
islative veto, Congress may find that it is feasible to enact more spe-
cific legislation without unduly sacrificing administrative flexibility. 
Surely the extreme generality of much statutory language suggests 
that some tightening up is possible. Several decisions of the 
Supreme Court in recent years indicate that some Justices, at least, 
believe that it would be both practical and appropriate for Congress 
to legislate with greater precision. Thus Chadha might even be seen 
as part of a nascent campaign by the Court to force more accounta-
ble and responsible lawmaking by Congress.3 This possibility finds 
some support in the Chadha opinion itself, where the Court empha-
sized the principle of separation of powers and the need to protect 
the integrity of the legislative process. Certainly a serious intent to 
enforce the principle of separation of powers would lead eventually 
to judicial reassessment of the scope of the lawmaking powers now 
routinely lodged in the executive branch as well as to a reassessment 
of the degree to which the accountability of these agencies is 
achieved largely through judicial supervision rather than through 
the political process. 
The Chadha decision, then, may signal a major rupture and 
realignment of the patterns of power distribution that have grown 
up among the departments of the national government since the 
New Deal. Under the most hopeful view, this realignment may 
eventually enhance the legislative and political arenas, reducing the 
influence of experts and lawyers over public policy. Will the deci-
sion have this healthy significance or will it only make government 
more clumsy and, in the end, even discourage Congress from seek-
ing to exercise significant control over the executive agencies? I be-
lieve that Chadha will prove to be hostile to the democratic process 
3. For a thoughtful argument for such a campaign, see Brubaker, Slouching Toward 
Constitutional Duty: The Legislative Veto and the Delegation of Authority, I CONST. COMM. 
81 (1984). See also Goldsmith, INS v. Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine: A Specula-
tion, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 749 (1984); Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law By Any 
Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEG. I (1984). 
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and destructive of popular accountability. The basis for this conclu-
sion begins to emerge from attention to the one respect in which 
Chadha rather plainly represents a confirmation of, rather than a 
departure from, modern patterns of power distribution: its affirm-
ance of the centrality of judicial power. 
II 
Chadha indicates that the Supreme Court's own role in con-
trolling the other branches of government through constitutional 
interpretation, a role that has expanded inexorably over the last 
thirty years, can be expected to continue to grow. This may seem 
obvious enough from the Court's willingness "in one fell swoop" to 
cast into serious doubt the validity of over 200 statutory provisions 
that had been enacted over many years by a coequal branch of gov-
ernment. The numbers alone, however, do not begin to describe the 
kind of role that the Court is increasingly assuming. 
Ever since John Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 
it has been understood that, when the issue at stake is the practical 
means by which the great ends of government are to be achieved, 
the power of judicial review ought to be exercised only sparingly. 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to 
make "all laws ... necessary and proper" for carrying out its enu-
merated powers, and in McCulloch Marshall emphasized that this 
grant of power had been made so that the legislature could "avail 
itself of experience, ... exercise its reason, and ... accommodate its 
legislation to circumstances." Marshall wrote that on a question 
regarding the "respective powers of those who are equally the repre-
sentatives of the people," the Court should give great weight to 
judgments embedded in political practice, at least if the issue is 
fairly debatable ("one on which human reason may pause, and the 
human judgment be suspended"). The theme that the definition of 
governmental powers involves practical questions largely unsuited 
for judicial review has been powerfully restated by modern jurists. 
Justice Jackson, for instance, wrote: 
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to 
judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or 
even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the 
better to insure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed 
powers into a workable government.4 
Some analysts have gone even further. Madison declared that "the 
4. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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several departments being perfectly coordinate by the terms of their 
common commission, none of them ... can pretend to an exclusive 
or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective 
powers. "s The idea that the Court ought to refrain from defining 
the constitutional powers of each branch of government, or at least 
ought to exercise great caution on such issues, has been sounded 
again and again-by framers, by great jurists, and by scholars. 
The Supreme Court's record since McCulloch has for the most 
part reflected agreement with these cautions. The bulk of the 
Court's work has involved the invalidation of acts of state and local 
governments, not federal statutes. And invalidation of federal stat-
utes involving questions of power allocation (rather than individual 
rights) has been even rarer. The most important judicial foray into 
issues of federal power allocation-the Court's invalidation of much 
of the New Deal-stands today as a monument to inappropriate use 
of judicial power. 
In recent years, however, the Court's general willingness to use 
its power has included a growing inclination to monopolize ques-
tions of power definition at the nationallevel.6 In 1969, for exam-
ple, the Court overturned the exclusion of Adam Clayton Powell 
from the House of Representatives despite the apparent constitu-
tional commitment of questions regarding "the qualifications of its 
own members" to each House of Congress. 1 The Court thus as-
sumed for itself the power to define Congress's constitutional au-
thority over its own operations, blandly insisting that this sort of 
determination "falls within the traditional role accorded courts 
. . " The Powell decision raises the serious possibility that the 
5. Quoted in J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRO-
CESS 267 (1980). 
6. Until its recent reversal in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 
105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), most commentators would have cited National League of Cities v. 
Usery as a prominent example of this trend, since Usery subordinated the exercise of Con-
gress's commerce power to judicial interpretations of the tenth amendment. Even before 
declaring this issue nonjusticiable in Garcia, however, the Court showed much more concern 
about defining the relationship between Congress and the other branches of the national gov-
ernment than about the relationship between Congress and the states. This difference, now 
especially emphatic because of the contrast between Chadha and Garcia, is odd inasmuch as 
it seems to involve the premise that the states can adequately protect their constitutional 
status through influence on the national political process but that Congress and the Executive 
cannot. The analysis of Chadha developed in this essay suggests, as one would certainly 
expect, that the difference does not in fact turn on any assessment of relative political influ-
ence. It turns instead on whether the Court believes that any significant constitutional princi-
ple is being entrusted to congressional politics. See infra note II. Deference to the exercise of 
Congress's commerce power is, then, not so much an exception to judicial monopolization of 
power over constitutional questions of power distribution as a judgment that federalism does 
not involve such questions. 
7. Art. I, § 5 states, "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and 
Qualifications of its own Members .... " 
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Court may invade the clear authority of Congress over the impeach-
ment process. 
In 1974 the Justices rushed to judgment in the famous case 
involving the power of the judiciary to subpoena President Nixon's 
Watergate tapes. In sober second light it is now clear that this was 
a case for judicial caution.s No specific constitutional provision was 
involved; the issues of whether to read a presidential power of im-
munity into the Constitution and how to balance such an implied 
power against the judiciary's authority were exceedingly difficult, 
certainly issues on which "human reason may pause." Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court not only acted, but acted in enormous haste, 
deciding the case before the Court of Appeals could even hear argu-
ments on the propriety of Judge Sirica's ruling. Meanwhile the ap-
propriate committee of Congress was responsibly exercising its 
undoubted constitutional authority to investigate the possible im-
peachment and removal of the President. The Court's action in 
Nixon effectively aborted the investigation, further reducing the 
credibility of the constitutional sanction for presidential 
misconduct. 
As in the Powell case, the Nixon Court displayed a disturbing 
insensitivity to institutional considerations. The Justices seemed 
unable to understand, let alone credit, the possibility that all consti-
tutional issues are not equivalent. It swept 200 years of constitu-
tional wisdom and theory aside with easy talismanic phrases 
regarding the judicial department's duty "to say what the law is." 
Whatever one thinks of the wisdom of the Court's specific resolu-
tions of the Powell and Nixon cases, both display an alarming obdu-
racy on the great and subtle issues surrounding the appropriate use 
of judicial power. 
The Chadha decision must be understood within the context of 
the modern Court's tendency to monopolize the resolution of con-
stitutional issues of power distribution. The Court's willingness-
indeed, eagerness-to strike down the legislative veto is a powerful 
illustration of the recent tendency to sweep within "the judicial 
power" the authority to decide organizational issues, even those 
that involve the operations of another branch and are apparently 
committed by the Constitution to that other branch. A decision 
that so profoundly trivializes the constitutional responsibilities of 
Congress is, to say the least, an unlikely vehicle for injecting new 
vigor and integrity into the lawmaking process. 
8. For a detailed and sensitive treatment of this subject, see Gunther, Judicial Hegem-
ony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. 
REv. 30 (1974). 
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III 
Some may object that this view of Chadha ignores the clarity of 
the constitutional issue in the case. Indeed, the Court's opinion 
tried strenuously to demonstrate that the legislative veto was un-
constitutional for plain and important reasons. 
The Court emphasized that specific, unequivocal constitutional 
provisions require that laws be passed by both Houses of Congress 
and that they be presented to the President for his approval or veto. 
The resolution regarding Chadha's immigration status was adopted 
by only the House of Representatives and was never offered to the 
President. No matter what deference is due Congress, surely the 
Court ought to enforce the straightforward procedures that define 
how statutes are to be enacted. Laws are not laws unless properly 
adopted. Human reason need not pause, one might think, on such a 
question. 
As the Court emphasized, the "finely wrought and exhaus-
tively considered [lawmaking] procedure" serves the most funda-
mental purposes. It protects against improvident legislation and the 
usurpation of executive authority by Congress. The procedure is 
integral to the "constitutional design for separation of powers": 
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new federal govern-
ment into three defined categories, legislative, executive, and judicial, to assure, as 
nearly as possible, that each Branch of government would confine itself to its as-
signed responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate 
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objec-
tives, must be resisted. 
According to the Court, then, the legislative veto was inconsistent 
with the basic constitutional structure. Under this view, the 
Supreme Court in Chadha was not denigrating the constitutional 
responsibilities of Congress but merely was insisting that those re-
sponsibilities be carried out in accordance with the plain design of 
the Constitution. 
Unfortunately, however, the Court's effort to depict the issue 
as simple cannot remove the real complexities involved. If the deci-
sion whether to cancel Chadha's deportation was "lawmaking," re-
quiring bicameral approval and presentment to the President, how 
could the executive branch have been authorized to make precisely 
the same decision? Conversely, since under the Court's view the 
deportation decision was not "legislative" when made by the Attor-
ney General, why must Congress follow lawmaking rules when it 
makes the same decision? Both explicitly (for example, impeach-
ment) and implicitly (for example, investigations), the Constitution 
authorizes each House of Congress, acting alone, to do many tasks 
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that are not lawmaking. The difficult question raised but not an-
swered by Chadha, then, is why Congress may not, under its power 
to make all laws "necessary and proper," enact legislation authoriz-
ing itself to engage in nonlawmaking oversight of the executive 
branch's use of delegated authority. 
Much of the Court's opinion was given over to explanations of 
why the House's decision regarding Chadha's deportation was 
"lawmaking" in some generic sense. The Court said the decision 
altered the legal rights of a private individual as well as the legal 
obligations of government officials. However, judges and executive 
officials (including the Attorney General who suspended Chadha's 
deportation) routinely alter legal rights without "legislating." In-
deed, subpoenas issued for legislative investigations alter legal rights 
of witnesses but are not acts of legislation. Equally plainly, the 
House resolution did not alter any legal obligations of government 
officials. Both before and after the resolution, the Attorney General 
had statutory authority to put a final stop to the deportation only if 
Congress did not object. This legal obligation was entirely un-
changed by the House resolution. 
The Court also pointed out that the resolution supplanted ac-
tion that normally or traditionally was legislative in character. His-
torically, deportations had been prevented by special bills that had 
been passed by both Houses and signed by the President. Tradition, 
however, does not make the decision whether to cancel a deporta-
tion unavoidably "legislative" or else that function could not have 
been delegated to an executive officer. Similarly, the Court de-
scribed the decision as a policy matter; but again, if the cancellation 
was policy making for the House, it was equally policy making for 
the Attorney General, who cannot legislate. 
In short, if anything in the Court's opinion had indicated that 
Congress had improperly delegated its lawmaking power to the At-
torney General, the insistence that Congress decide about Chadha's 
deportation only through the lawmaking procedure would have 
made sense. In that event, Chadha might have represented a new 
emphasis on political accountability and integrity in the legislative 
process. However, because the Court clearly assumed throughout 
its opinion that the suspension decision could properly be made by 
executive officials (and afterwards by judges), the description of the 
deportation decision as "lawmaking" is only perplexing. 
Of course, it is logically possible, although it would seem odd, 
to say that a function is generically "lawmaking" when performed 
by one House of Congress, and yet the same function is not law-
making when performed by the nonlegislative branches. But why 
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adopt such a variable meaning for "lawmaking"? Why require 
Congress to follow the precise procedures relevant to enacting stat-
utes for a decision that can be made without these protective steps 
by the other branches of government? Far removed now from plain 
meanings and unambiguous text, such a position would require 
strong reasons to satisfy difficult questions; the reasons would have 
to be powerful enough to overcome the long-established under-
standing that practical judgments about how to achieve legislative 
ends are not for the judiciary. The Court's opinion relied on the 
principle of separation of powers to supply some of these reasons, 
but in so doing it demonstrated only a misunderstanding of the 
Constitution and deep hostility to the legislative process. 
IV 
The Chadha opinion repeatedly invoked "the Constitutional 
design for separation of powers." The theory of separation of pow-
ers came to America from the seventeenth century Levellers, who 
opposed the British King's participation in lawmaking.9 The theory 
was passed through Montesquieu, and contributed to the Jeffersoni-
ans' opposition to aristocracy and their extreme commitment to 
popular control over lawmaking. As the Court noted in Chadha, 
separation of powers in its pure form involves differentiation by 
function. Power is to be checked by dividing it; each branch exer-
cises a distinctive type of power, and none shares or interferes with 
the power exercised by the others. 
In the American Constitution separation of powers was com-
bined with a different principle-balance. Constitutional balance 
has its antecedents in the mixed government of Great Britain, where 
royalty shared some of the lawmaking function and where the aris-
tocracy was given both the power to judge and the power to make 
laws in the House of Lords. Balance involves sharing of power 
among the branches of government and active checking of one 
branch by another; its functions have been to block popular control 
over lawmaking and to assure representation of class interests. 
It is elementary that these opposite principles, separation and 
balance, were strangely and successfully combined by the framers. 
The Constitution divides government into three distinct branches, 
and the lawmaking power is given to a popularly accountable 
branch. However, the President shares the judicial function 
through, for instance, his pardon power; and he shares the legisla-
9. An extended account of the principles of balance and separation and their historical 
derivations can be found in M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POW-
ERS (1967). 
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tive function through his veto power. The Senate shares the execu-
tive function, for example, by its power to confirm appointments. 
And the doctrine of judicial review permits courts to share (and 
check) the power of both the legislative and executive branches. 
Now, despite the Court's emphatic reliance on the theory of 
separation of powers, it should be plain that the legislative veto con-
sidered in Chadha did not threaten the principle of separation.Io 
Insofar as it violated the bicameralism requirement, the veto 
threatened only the principle of balance, raising the possibility that 
class or regional interests would not be adequately represented in a 
deportation decision accomplished by a vote of only one House of 
Congress. Insofar as the veto violated the presentment require-
ment, it did threaten the authority of the executive branch. But 
authority of what kind? The executive authority at risk was, first, 
the authority of the President to veto a specific decision to suspend 
a deportation (the President having already had the opportunity to 
veto the general scheme setting up the system of legislative vetoes in 
deportation cases). The veto power, again, is a part of the principle 
of balance whereby the legislative power is shared and checked by 
the Executive. The second kind of presidential authority at risk 
was the authority to make the suspension decision itself, for the At-
torney General's determination under the Immigration Act could 
be, and was, reversed by one House of Congress. But this is the very 
decision that the Court described at length as legislative in nature. In 
this respect also, then, the kind of executive authority threatened 
was the President's authority to share (through exceedingly broad 
delegation) the power of lawmaking. 
The Court invalidated a device found in over 200 federal statu-
tory provisions by invoking separation of powers when it meant, if 
anything, the opposite principle of constitutional balance. That the 
Court could misname a fundamental principle is in itself disturbing 
in a country where vast judicial power is justified by reference to the 
capacity of judges to understand and apply legal principles. More 
important, understanding the principle that Chadha does imple-
ment helps to remove the last shadows from around the decision. 
Although the Court spoke in terms of separation of powers and em-
phasized the protection of the integrity of legislative procedures, the 
decision in fact protected a principle, traceable to the British royalty 
and House of Lords, that has long been at war with popularly ac-
countable legislatures. Chadha is a striking expansion of the judi-
10. For a different treatment of the Court's confusion of separation and balance, see 
Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of Powers Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 
715 (1984). 
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cia! assault on the democratic values associated with the principle of 
separation of powers, which allocates the lawmaking function to 
Congress and not to the executive or judicial branch. 
Once the real issue in Chadha is properly named, some small 
but bewildering aspects of the Court's opinion become understanda-
ble. Not only in its major contours but also in its detail, the opinion 
expresses repugnance at the legislative process. The decision is per-
meated by a hostility to the Congress that, once perceived, makes it 
obvious that the possibility of a judicially-led reinvigoration of the 
political process is fanciful. 
In its description of the facts, the Court observed that in 
Chadha's case Congress waited "for reasons not disclosed" for a full 
year and a half to decide about his deportation. Similarly, the 
Court mentioned the precise date of the House's action and the ter-
mination date of the statutory time period for vetoing the suspen-
sion, making plain that if the House had waited seven more days, 
"Chadha's deportation proceedings would have been cancelled." 
Although it was relevant to nothing in the case, the Court stated 
that the House resolution was "not printed" and "was not made 
available to other members of the House [besides those in the rele-
vant committee] prior to the vote." The Court also noted, for no 
apparent reason, that Chadha's case was one of a group of some 340 
and that the resolution in his case passed without debate or re-
corded vote. And it opined (in a footnote) that "[i]t is not at all 
clear whether the House generally or Chairman Eilberg in particu-
lar ... understood the relationship between the Resolution and the 
Attorney General's decision .... " 
In short, much of the Court's statement of the facts of the case 
bears little if any relationship to the legal issues involved; the 
Court's purpose, obviously, was to paint a grim picture of the qual-
ity of the legislative process. Whether or not this process worked as 
badly in Chadha's case as the Court implied, there is no doubt that 
legislative decisionmaking can be uninformed, cruel, and messy. 
This is no doubt true as well for many decisions that issue from the 
bowels of the bureaucracy or judiciary. The more rational proce-
dures, often presumed to be generally available from administrators 
or judges, are, at any rate, a reflection of their distinct functions. To 
perform their functions, legislators must respond to felt constituent 
concerns and must trade across issues; the legislature's role in a de-
mocracy requires it to operate differently (and perhaps more unti-
dily) than the other branches. If responsibilities are to be removed 
from the Congress whenever legislative techniques look different 
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from judicial or administrative processes, there will be little of im-
portance left for the Congress to contribute. 
If there remains any doubt about whether Chadha portends a 
reinvigoration of the legislative process, consider that the decision 
also contained a long and approving discussion of congressional ex-
perience with the impracticality of special deportation bills. Thus 
the only congressional judgment given credence in the Court's opin-
ion is the admission that Congress could not hope to legislate well 
on the individual suspension issues that much of the Court's opin-
ion defined as inherently legislative in nature. With the legislative 
veto invalidated and special bills declared too cumbersome, Con-
gress has left only the option of delegating its lawmaking authority 
to the other branches of government. 
Chadha is justifiable, if at all, only on the ground that the judi-
ciary, not the legislature, is the appropriate forum for deciding the 
practical questions that arise in the difficult, complicated effort to 
make the modem regulatory state democratically accountable. The 
significance of the decision is not that it protects the principle of 
separation of powers or that it offers new hope for the integrity or 
importance of the legislative process. 11 Its significance is that it 
confirms and accelerates the drive, which until Chadha could be 
discerned but not fully appreciated, toward the judicial monopoliza-
tion of crucial questions of power definition and distribution. 
II. Indeed, the view of Chadha offered here puts in a different perspective those cases 
where the Court has apparently deferred to and respected congressional judgment. In sus-
taining the application of provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local em-
ployees, for example, the Court virtually abandoned to Congress decisions as to what is 
"necessary and proper" in reconciling the commerce power with the tenth amendment. Gar· 
cia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). However, 
Chadha suggests that Garcia must rest Jess on a determination that Congress should share 
constitutional decisionmaking with the Court than on a determination that there is no con-
tent to the tenth amendment independent of bald political outcomes. For confirmation of this 
view in the Garcia opinion itself, see 105 S. Ct. at 1011-18. Read in light of Chadha, then, 
Garcia simply reflects the Court's remarkably low regard for federalism as a legal principle. 
